A surprising contact on LinkedIn. An offer of work from a recruiter, probably a young woman, based in China. The opportunity to earn perhaps £20,000 part-time writing a small number of political reports for a Chinese company containing confidential or “insider” information. Compensation in digital currency or physical money preferred.
It may seem clear, in this scenario, that something about this approach would be suspicious. However, Beijing's powerful intelligence agency still considers it worthwhile to use headhunters to attempt this – prompting the domestic spy agency to issue multiple warnings about their activity on the internet.
Massive Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
In 2023, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said operatives from China were contacting UK citizens on the platform on an unprecedented scale, at a rate of ten thousand over the previous 30-month period, attempting to obtain political, industrial, military and scientific classified information. But a new initiative aimed at politicians and parliament has prompted the intelligence service to act again.
An espionage warning was issued on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords counterpart: a single slide after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and other operatives to contact Members of Parliament, lords, their staffers, economists, thinktanks – anyone who might provide information.
Intelligence Strategy and Legal Changes
In the curious manner of British intelligence, there was no official release of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. But the service knew its briefing note would become public once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Sharing it in the press assists the general population better identify interactions with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the impact of flushing out more information from in and around Westminster, though that is not MI5’s main objective. The service aims for public figures to understand that simply because interactions on professional networks are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is domestic spy agency believed to have been reacting to a particular event in parliament, though the burst of activity occur after the embarrassing collapse of the prosecution of a ex-assistant an individual and his friend another person on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of spying for China – a charge they denied – but failure to successfully conclude a trial under the since replaced Official Secrets Act resulted in concerns that British democracy had been left unprotected.
Revised Legislation and China's Long-Term Interests
Legislation has since been updated, and the MI5 slide contains a note of its successor: “Individuals involved in espionage activity risk substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” This constitutes a criminal offense if somebody participates in behavior that is or is likely to “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious inquiry, though, is what China has to gain. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted knowledge of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs even less. But the Chinese government is also interested in parliament: for a time, in recent years, the UK’s approach to China on matters such as Huawei or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being driven by parliamentarians.
Methodological Differences and Ongoing Cyber Risks
To a degree there are distinct approaches too. Authoritarian governments like China’s utilize intelligence collection techniques and the scale of its intelligence apparatus is vast, employing three hundred thousand individuals. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, said it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
Beijing is willing to develop contacts over the extended period and sometimes even the agencies have found it difficult to differentiate genuine connections and espionage. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for what information is deemed to be useful,” security minister Dan Jarvis told parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the government situation may result in an individual quickly marginal becomes important.
An alternative perspective to consider the relentless activities at secret intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the west at a level under the point of direct conflict. The nation has stepped up its cyber operations, with the one campaign infiltration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of millions connected equipment.
Beijing is engaged in persistent efforts to identify secret informants on British democracy via digital means because it wants to be provocative, to display influence and because it can.
